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Social History: on the Way to Becoming a Historical 
Cultural Science?*
Since the mid-1980s, terms such as “the everyday” (Alltag), “expe­
rience”, “life-world” and “culture” have achieved a meaning and significance 
which have come to define the new direction taken by social history in the 
last decade.1 In what follows, I will first of all outline the conjunctural links 
between these new or renewed concepts and the criticisms that have been 
directed at objectivist structural functionalism in historical social science. I 
will then go on to ask w hether labels such as “the history of everyday life” 
(Alltagsgeschichte), the “history of experience” (Erfahrungsgeschichte) or “his­
torical anthropology” (Historische Anthropologie) are able to symbolise and 
develop fu rther post-structural changes in social history. O r might it no t be 
m ore appropriate to speak about the beginnings of a new historical cultural 
science (Historische Kulturwissenschaft)} Are we dealing with the belated 
in troduction of a qualitative paradigm2 in the field of historical social sci­
ence (Historische Sozialwissenschaft)'} Do the exponents of the new approaches 
already constitute a “third generation” of historical social scientists, succes­
sors to both the first generation, who form ulated their conception of an 
historical social science in the 1960s and 1970s and defended it against the 
m ainstream  of the time,3 and the second generation, who spread its new 
social scientific paradigm  in the 1980s? Finally, I will ask where all this fits 
into the discourse of post-modernism.
* Original German version published in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft20 (1994), pp. 445-68.
1 I would like to thank  Ulrike Docker and Erich Landsteiner for their com ments and 
criticism on this article.
2 For an introductory  overview, see: U. Flick et al. (eds.), Qualitative Sozialforschung, 
M ünchen 1991; S. Lam nek, Qualitative Sozialforschung, vol. I: M ethodologie, vol. II: 
M ethoden und  Techniken, M ünchen 1988/89; A. Giddens, Interpretative Soziologie, 
Frankfurt 1984.
3 H-U. Wehler, Geschichte als Historische Sozialwissenschaft, Frankfurt 1973; J. Kocka, 
Sozialgeschichte. Begriff -  Entwicklung-Probleme, Göttingen 1977, 2"c' edition 1986.
Filozofski vestnik, XVIII (2/1997), pp. 257-283. 257
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Structure instead of culture — a categorical confusion.
During the founding period of historical social science in the 1960s and 
1970s, those members of the German historical profession who were m ore 
open to innovation and new theoretical developments -  at that time, a group 
very much in the minority -  focused on the structures beh ind  social, eco­
nomic and political phenom ena. Partly, this was done by employing statisti­
cal data or by converting o ther kinds o f docum entary m aterial, such as 
nominative sources, into statistical data, using statistical techniques which 
operated far more descriptively than analytically. The initial work in this 
direction was carried out above all by French historians o f the so-called 
“Annales school”. After a certain interval, the ideas of the Annales historians 
came to heavily influence historians in West Germany (and later still, in 
Austria), who began to employ structural paradigms, albeit in modified form 
and -  after the events of the Second World War and the H olocaust -  in a 
politicised m anner.4 The subsequent years witnessed a large am ount o f re­
search in this vein, which provided new and interesting insights into such 
areas as household and kinship systems, family structures, property or la­
bour relationships and yields on landed and feudal estates, changes in prices 
and wages, the social structure of the memberships of political parties (such 
as the NSDAP) and so on.
From today’s point of view, the greatest weakness in the first wave of 
German-language structural historical research (as was the case with com­
parable work undertaken in France, Britain and the U.S.) was its thorough­
going neglect of the supposed subjects of the work in question. T hat is to 
say that the interpretations, actions and experiences of the historical actors 
themselves tended to be ignored, because of the specifically structural per­
spective adopted when investigating such them es as households, families, 
feudal estates, firms, associations, political parties or whatever, even if the 
concern was not simply to construct “structural m odels”, bu t also to write 
history -  a new, social scientific history.5 Just as Fernand Braudel’s grand
4 A m ore extensive discussion of these issues is given in: R. Sieder, “Was heiß t 
Sozialgeschichte? Brüche und  K ontinuitäten in der A neignung des Sozialen”, in: 
Österreichische Zeitschrift fü r  Geschichtswissenschaften (OZG) 1 (1990) 1, pp. 25-48. O n 
some o f the differences between the use of structural concepts in the social history 
practised by the French Annalistes and that o f Germ an-speaking historical social 
scientists, see (among others): H. Kaelble, “Sozialgeschichte in Frankreich u n d  der 
Bundesrepublik: Annales gegen historische Sozialwissenschaften”, in: Geschichte und  
Gesellschaft (GG) 13 (1987), pp. 77-93.
5 My own earliest scientific research at the end o f the 1970s was very m uch in line with 
this structural functionalist tradition. For example: R. Sieder, “S trukturproblem e der
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narrative La Méditerranée (1949) had begun to treat time and space as sub­
jective actors,6 so a num ber of structural-analytical studies located themselves 
within the same categorical shift: the logic of structures replaced the social 
logic of the actors. To give ju st one example, the following citation from 
A rthur E. Im hof’s article on “Rural family structures” stands as a typical 
example of 1970s social history (both in terms of its title and content):
“Malthusian shocks were greatly feared long before Malthus; over­
population and its reduction by means of positive checks (famine, 
plague, war) hit large sections of the population directly and severely. 
There were constant efforts to prevent such a development, ia that the 
potential fertility of women was restricted, be it through the control of 
marital fecundity (lengthening of the intervals between conception, 
lowering the age at birth of the last child) or through increasing the 
p roportion of unm arried adults in the population, extending 
widowhood or, finally, by means of raising the marriage age for 
women.”7
ländlichen Familie im 19. Jh .”, in: Zeitschrift fü r  bayerische Landesgeschichte41 (1978), pp. 
173-217; see also: R. Sieder and M. Mitterauer, Vom Patriarchat zur Partnerschaft. Zum 
Strukturwandel der Familie, (1977), 4th edition, M ünchen 1991; engl.: The European 
Family, O xford 1982, 4rcl edition 1989.
® F. Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II, Paris 1949.
So far as I know, the earliest reception of Braudel’s ideas in the German-speaking 
countries was W. Conze in: Historische Zeitschrift (HZ) 172 (1951), pp. 358-62. In 
retrospect, it now seems understandable precisely why the group associated with the 
Annales and  later, the first generation of historical social scientists associated with 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft in West Germany, tu rned away from the subjective in o rder 
to draw atten tion  to the “structures” and “conjunctures” at work behind the subjects 
themselves. This was very m uch a reaction to what they saw as the hegemony of an 
historicist tradition which was oriented around politics, states and great individuals. 
Yet in effect, this move away from  the idealistically conceived subject merely ended 
up throw ing ou t the baby with the bath-water: in B raudel’s work, people find 
themselves in a form  of prison, where the sentences are of different length; they act 
and make decisions only at the upperm ost and more superficial of the three levels 
into which he divides historical time, namely that of l'histoire événementielle. As the 
older Braudel wrote, “history” on the contrary is made “far removed from our persons 
an d  o u r daily misery [...], sh ifting  slowly, as slowly as the anc ien t life o f the 
M editerranean”, see: F. Braudel, “Personal Testimony”, in Journal of Modern History
44 (1972) pp. 448-67. In the following decades, historiography increasingly lost sight 
o f the individual as a “societal being” (Karl M arx). Social history was written virtually 
w ithout people, in term s of data; or to borrow the chic phraseology of its French 
originators, the structural approach represented the death of the subject.
7 A. E. Im hof, “L än d lich e  F am ilien s tru k tu ren  an einem  hessischen Beispiel: 
H euchelheim  1690-1900”, in: W. Conze (ed.), Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit 
Europas, S tuttgart 1976, p. 206.
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This sample text shows ju st how easily historians fell into the trap of 
reifying these kinds of structures. These narratives (which actually aim ed to 
be anything but “narratives”) removed the actual impact of structural changes 
either to the realms of the general consciousness of anonymous historical 
actors (“Malthusiasn shocks were greatly feared...”) or else structures were 
assigned the status of quasi-actors. In doing so, historians b lurred the differ­
ence between a scientific classification system based on collected data and 
the social specificity of what they thought they were observing. This was a 
result of the heady euphoria created by the belief that historians had attained 
a greater degree of scientific exactitude through their statistical m easure­
m ent of certain phenom ena, rather than com prehending the m eaning of 
what people tell about themselves (their “statem ents”) . I would describe this 
substitution of the social logic of the actors with the logic of a specific kind 
of structures, or the attribution of subjective characteristics to these struc­
tures, as structural realism. This constituted a disciplinary variation on the 
structural functionalism predom inant in all the social sciences during the 
1960s and 1970s. Within that genre, historical subjects only appear -  if at all
-  as puppets on the strings of structures. They occupy social positions and 
use interpretations which are already predeterm ined: for example, they alter 
their fertility patterns as if they were already obeying M althus’ theory long 
before Malthus himself. In practice, however, this methodology contradicted 
in one central respect the -  at the time oft proclaim ed -  desire to stim ulate 
an emancipatory and illuminative social science: the new direction failed to 
provide adequate empirical insights into the processes whereby historical 
actors contributed actively to the formation or alteration of the relationships 
within their particular space for acting (Handlungsspielraum).
An alternative: the praxiological approach
Around the mid-1980s, a num ber o f social historians began to study 
the works of the French cultural sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. His critique 
of structural functionalism and structuralism (as practised in the disciplines 
o f sociology and ethnology) proved to be o f g reatest in terest, because 
Bourdieu’s arguments provided the basis for an effective and theoretically 
well-versed critique of the latent attachm ent to structural realism displayed 
by so many works of historical social science. It now becam e clear that a 
significant consequence of the one-dimensionality present in historical so­
cial science was that societies and their sub-systems (political parties, asso­
ciations, firms, bureaucracies, households, families etc.) were treated as socio-
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structural “facts”, as “things” in pure Durkheimian fashion.8 Partly drawing 
on the argum ents of Max W eber’s interpretative sociology, Bourdieu dem­
onstrated that these socio-structural “facts” actually only become social real­
ity when they are appropriated  by historical actors. In systemic terms, the 
appropriation o f social conditions can mean either the continuation (the 
reproduction) of those conditions or their alteration. In both cases, the situ­
ation derives partly from  individuals (through the decisions and actions 
pertaining to their personal life-course) and partly from the context of so­
cial action in which social groups and classes, societies or international or­
ganisations are involved. In all these situations, people are very much ac­
tors, rather than simply being the mere puppets of external conditions or 
prisoners o f structures. In the social theoretical approach offered here, in­
dividuals are no longer determ ined from above, but neither are they “free” 
to act in completely autonom ous fashion, in line with their conscious actions, 
knowledge and  intentions (as in the idealist conception of history).
A new social theoretical conception of social history’s general object 
developed on the basis of Bourdieu’s arguments. W here Braudel, Conze 
and others had viewed social history as the investigation of the hierarchical, 
structural orders determ ining hum an action, whose conjunctural variations 
consisted of mid- to long-term trends and short-lived events,9 this new con­
ception understood its subject-matter to be a dialectical process between what­
ever conditions for action existed in a particular time and place and the actual 
practices of historical actors. “Social reality”, a central notion taken on board 
from interpretative sociology, now seemed to be constituted in a dual way: 
on the one hand, “social reality” consisted of a set of given factors, which 
could be described in terms of social, economic and political structures. On 
the o ther hand, it also comprised the actions and interpretations of actors, 
who produce, extenuate or change those given, structured conditions for 
action; in o ther words, social agents “structurise” social reality. Contrary to 
the practice of structural social history, conditions for action no longer took 
pride of place in historical analysis, because they were not now considered
Social History: on the Way to Becoming a Historical Cultural Science?
8 E. Dürkheim , Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode (Paris 1895), Frankfurt ] 984, p. 115:. 
“The first an d  most basic rule is to treat sociological things as facts”.
9 See, F. Braudel, “Histoire et sciences sociales. La longue durée”, in: Annales 13 (1958), 
pp. 725-53; German: “Die longue durée”, in: H.-U. Wehler (ed.), Geschichte und Soziologie, 
Köln 1972, pp. 189-215; also in:. C. Honegger (ed.), Schrift und Materie der Geschichte. 
Vorschläge zur systematischen Aneignung historischer Prozesse, Frankfurt 1977, pp .47-85. 
For a com paratively positive treatm ent o f (political) action, see: W. Conze, Die 




to be any m ore “real” than the actions, interpretations, ideologies and dis­
courses.10 Myths, mentalities and behaviour ceased to be a kind o f intellec­
tual mist obscuring historical reality and becam e instead its constitutive 
components, and thus a central part of the subject-matter of social histori­
cal research. For this reason, it is possible to speak of a “cultural theoretical 
change” in social history, whereby “culture” is understood as being inclu­
sive of actors’ viewpoints, meanings and in terpretations, as well as their 
structurised symbolic expression in texts, images, objects, rituals, gestures 
and so on .11
Admittedly, even within the framework of a post-structural and cultural 
theoretically expanded interpretation o f social history, it is still necessary to 
pose the question as to what possibilities historical actors actually have to 
shape and change circumstances according to their own interests and pre­
conceptions. In o ther words, we must ask if, and how, actors succeed in cre­
ating a consciousness of common interests and perceptions (for example, 
o f “justice”) , and which alliances they en ter into on the basis of such a con­
sciousness. If the consciousness of historical actors can no longer be m ore 
or less deduced from structures (as in structural functionalism) no r always 
be described as a “false consciousness” that will necessarily be corrected in 
the course of history (as in objectivist m arxism ), then we are obliged to raise 
again the question first posed by E. P. T hom pson13 at the end  of the 1970s: 
is it possible to talk about present or historical societies in terms o f the clas­
sical sociological terminology of “class” or “estate”? And what is the rela­
tionship between these analytically conceived schemas and what was per­
ceived as social reality at any given m om ent in time? How can we avoid the
10 Michel Foucault tried to draw the attention of “reality obsessed” historians to this 
issue, albeit with seemingly little success. See: M. Foucault, “La poussiere e t le nuage”, 
in: M. P errot (ed.), L'impossible prison. Recherches sur le systeme penitentiare au XIXe siècle, 
Paris 1980, p .34.; see also, M. Foucault, Archäologie des Wissens, F rankfurt 1973.
11 For an informative overview of the changing conceptions of the term  culture in the 
h isto rical and  social sciences, see: U. D an ie l, „K u ltu r“ u n d  „G esellschaft“. 
Ü berlegungen zum Gegenstandsbereich der Sozialgeschichte, in: GG19 (1993), pp. 
69-99.
12 Not “post-structuralist”, because neither French no r G erm an-language social history 
or “structural history” was ever “structuralist” in the sense of Lévi-Strauss o r any 
other structuralist concept in the field of ethnology or sociology. As an introductory  
essay see: A. H onneth, “Ein strukturalistischer Rousseau. Zur A nthropologie von 
Claude Lévi-Strauss”, in: idem ., Die zerrissene Welt des Sozialen. Sozialphilosophische Aufsätze, 
Frankfurt 1990, pp. 73-92.
13 E. P. Thompson, Das Elend der Theorie. Zur Produktion geschichtlicher Erfahrung, Frankfurt
1980.
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by now notorious mistake of equating historical reality with our precon­
ceived theoretical schemas, o r to put it another way, of confusing social logic 
with the logic o f the (social scientific) question? Bourdieu suggested that in 
logical terms we should think of class as an “ensemble of actors with similar 
attitudes [...], similar conditions and conditioning [...], to all intents and 
purposes similar dispositions and interests [... ] and consequently similar prac­
tices and ideological positions”. “Classes” of this kind are primarily theo­
retical in nature, no t real, effective classes “ready for struggle”. Yet at the 
same time, the above-m entioned similarities would lead us to expect that a 
consciousness of these similarities might develop among actors under cer­
tain circumstances. Adequately constructed theoretical classes are thus “prob­
able classes”, and  in no sense “automatically necessary”.14 The differences 
between theoretical and actual classes are thus no longer blurred. This rep­
resents an effective break with marxist tradition, which equated constructed 
and real classes with one another, or declared both “virtual” and “actual” 
classes to be real phenom ena, with the transition from one to the other being 
described in either deterministic or voluntaristic terms.
The quality of a theoretical framework such as “social classes” can be 
m easured according to the degree of precision and complexity with which 
it constructs the relationships within the order of praxis. In this respect, 
Bourdieu argues that it is necessary to define the actor’s “position” and “place” 
in social space as precisely as possible. An actor’s place and position result 
from  their relationship to the respective positions of the other actors in 
whichever social space has been constructed, because “what really exists is a 
relational space”.15 These relationships are defined in terms of the differ­
en t sorts of capital that the actor brings into play, be they material, spiritual, 
or intellectual, forms of gender capital (which always place the actor in a 
relationship with the other gender) or physical attraction and physical strength 
(whose worth is defined in relation to competing actors in the same field), 
and so on. Which kinds of capital will predom inate at any given m om ent or 
effectively define social relationships (social inequality, distribution of power, 
chances for success) depends upon the type of social field that we construct: 
education, knowledge and academic grade or title predom inate in the sci­
entific field, speed and physical strength in the area o f sport, material capi­
tal and business know-how in the economic sphere, and so on. As a rule, it 
is a particular accum ulation of several types of capital that defines the ac­
to r’s position and place in a given social space. However, all sorts of capital
14 P. Bourdieu, Sozialer Raum und Klassen, Frankfurt 1985, p. 12.
15 Ibid., p. 13.
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and the various combinations between them  only becom e socially relevant 
when they are recognised by other actors, or in Bourdieu’s words, when they 
become effective as symbolic capital.16
Clearly, this also means that the actor’s actions, in terpretations and 
experiences should form a central part of our general research focus, be­
cause they define the capacity to accumulate particular types o f capital, to 
assert oneself through them in a given sphere and to exert control and power 
over others. At the same time, actors can be seen to produce and structure 
social space through their actions and interpretations, given that we under­
stand social space as constituted by social relationships and interactions. We 
attain information about actors’ actions, interpretations and experiences 
essentially by means of interpreting their statements (understood in the broad­
est possible sense). That is the reason why the m ethodology of text in terpre­
tation and text production (such as various kinds o f memory-based in ter­
views) play such a central role in post-structural social history.
Historians’ confrontation with questions relating to texts as forms of 
written, acoustic or audiovisual statements by historical actors on the one 
hand, and the historiographical texts written about those actors (and their 
texts) on the other hand, have followed two rather different paths in recent 
years, despite the fact that both directions are frequently described in un ­
differentiated fashion as a single “linguistic turn". In the first place, adher­
ents of “Intellectual History” in the U.S.A. were influenced by the m ethods 
and practices of literary theory (history and literary theory having always 
been much closer disciplinary neighbours in terms o f university organisa­
tion there than in Europe). The main consequence o f this trend  has been 
the extensive discussion surrounding the fictional (that is to say, the liter­
ary) nature of historiography, as part of the critical confrontation with Hayden 
W hite’s theory of historiographical tropes.17 Secondly and by way of con­
trast, German-language social history came into contact with social scientific
16 On the concept o f “sorts of capital”, see: P. B ourdieu, “Ö konom isches Kapital, 
kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital”, in: R. Kreckel (ed .), Soziale Ungleichheiten (= Soziale 
Welt, Sonderband 2), Göttingen 1983, pp. 183-98; P. Bourdieu, Rede und Antwort, 
Frankfurt 1992, esp.: Raum und symbolische Macht, pp. 135; for an in troduction  to 
Bourdieu’s cultural sociological thinking, see again: A. H onneth , Die zerrissene Welt der 
symbolischen Formen, Frankfurt 1990, pp. 156-81.
17 See: H. W hite, Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Centruy Europe, 
Baltimore 1973; German: Metahistory. Die historische Einbildungskraft im 19. fli. inEuropa, 
Frankfurt 1991; idem., Die Bedeutung der Form. Erzählstrukturen in der Geschichtsschreibung, 
Frankfurt 1990. For discussions of W hite’s theories, see “Metahistory: Six Critiques”, 
in: History &  Theory (HT) Beiheft 19 (1980); B. D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The 
Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History, Philadelphia 1990; G. Brude-
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theories and models o f text analysis. By the very nature of their disciplines, 
social scientists working in the fields of sociology, psychology, pedagogy and 
psychoanalysis always deal with texts and the problems of their analysis. The 
m ethods of text analysis and production developed in this sphere were there­
fore taken over, adapted and developed further by a num ber of social his­
torians.18
The areas of research where these social scientific models of text analysis 
have m ost frequently been employed in the last decade or so have been the 
history o f National Socialism and the post-war era, a num ber of themes 
perta in ing  to the history o f everyday life and regional history, and most 
recently of all, the history of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) and 
Stalinism.19 Based on the research methods just m entioned, social history 
has jo in ed  the ranks of those social and textual sciences which employ an 
explorative social scientific research methodology to try and appropriate a 
sense o f “what the actor in a given historical sphere of action already knows 
and has to know, in order to ‘get his or her bearings’ in the daily activities 
of social life”.20 It is at this point that social history becomes an interpreta­
tive social science ( verstehende Sozialivissenschaft), to borrow a phrase coined 
by Max Weber.
At the same time, however, it is not enough for an interpretative his­
torical social science to confine itself to the textual analysis of subjective state­
ments, because these cannot be properly explained in terms of themselves 
alone, bu t only with reference to the structure of social, economic and cul­
tural relationships as well, together with the conditions for action present
Firnau and K. MacHardy (eds.), Fact and Fiction. German History and Literature 1848- 
1924, Tübingen 1990; K. MacHardy, “Crisis in History, or: Herm es U nbounded”, in: 
Storia della Storiografia 17 (1990), pp. 5-27; H. Nagl-Docekal, “Läßt sich die 
G eschichtsphilosophie tropologisch fundieren?” In: OZG4 (1993), pp. 466-78.
18 See H.-G. Soeffner (ed.), Interpretative Verfahren in den Sozial- und Textwissenschaften, 
S tuttgart 1979; G. Landsteiner, “Zum Stellenwert linguistischer Modelle in einer 
w issenssoziologischen Textanalyse”, in: Wisdom 6 (1992), p p .49-78; R. Sieder, 
“G eschichten erzählen und  Wissenschaft treiben. Interviewtexte zum Arbeiteralltag. 
E rkenntnistheoretische G rundlagen, Quellenkritik, Interpretationsverfahren und 
D a rs te llu n g sp ro b le m e ”, in : G. Botz et al. (ed s .), M ündliche Geschichte und  
Arbeiterbewegung, Wien 1984, pp. 203-31; R. Sieder and Ch. Gerbel, “Erzählungen sind 
n ic h t n u r  „w ahr“. A bstrak tionen , Typisierungen und  G eltungsansprüche in 
Interviewtexten”, in: G. Botz et al. (eds.), „Quantität und Qualität“. Zur Praxis der 
Methoden der Historischen Sozialwissenschaft, Frankfurt 1988, pp. 189-210.
19 See Footnotes 63-68.
2 0 A. G iddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambridge 
1984; German: Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft. Grundzüge einer Theorie der Strukturierung, 
F rankfurt and  New York 1988, p. 338.
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in a particular social space. As is already implicit in the theoretical form ula­
tion of the dual construction of social reality, social historical analysis must 
therefore also examine the historical conditions for social action (conditions 
which have been structured by social practices). Post-structural history thus 
reconstructs external structures too, albeit w ithout any longer believing that 
these structures strictly determ ine social actions and interpretations: the 
“structural” is seen instead as characteristic o f the relationships p roduced  by 
social interaction. Post-structural social history thus has a variety of m eth­
ods at its disposal, including both techniques o f statistical and dem ographic 
research and those o f discourse and text analysis,21 in o rder to illum inate 
the conceptual space with which actors are confronted when m aking their 
interpretations, and to understand the changes that those spaces undergo.
The kind of post-structural social history proposed here  is in this re­
spect differentiated from strictly phenom enological sociology o r ethno- 
methodology, which confine their research programmes to the investigation 
of social interaction, rituals, gestures, interpretations and m eanings.22 From 
the same standpoint, a num ber of works o f the so-called “new cultural his­
tory”23 would appear to be overly “culturalisdc” in focus, to the extent that 
they reify symbolic forms and ignore the ontological difference between 
surviving texts and past practices. They focus too narrowly on the m eanings 
of symbolic forms, without fully recognising that the latter can also be ap­
propriated and used by actors in various ways.24 I would therefore argue 
for a social history capable of overcoming the varieties of objectivism, sub­
jectivism and culturalism in equal measure. Bourdieu has suggested that we 
call this a praxiological mode of knowledge,25 and it is precisely this kind of 
approach that many social historians are now attem pting to apply to the 
history of everyday life, historical anthropology or micro-history, whatever 
their differences and disagreements on points of detail.
21 See, above all: M. Foucault, Archäologie des Wissens; idem, Die Ordnung des Diskurses, 
M ünchen 1974, 2nc* edition Frankfurt 1991; a recent critique o fF oucau lt’s authorial 
interpretation of discourse, as if the latter were itself a social actor, can be found in: 
V. Biti, “Geschichte als L iteratur -  L iteratur als G eschichte”, in: ÖZG 4 (1993), pp. 
371-96.
22 See: E. Weingarten et al. (eds.), Ethnomethodologie. Beiträge zu einer Sozialgeschichte des 
Alltagshandelns, Frankfurt 1976.
23 See: L. H unt, History, Culture, and Text, in: idem (ed.), The New Cultural History, 
London 1989, pp. 1-22.
24 See R. Chartier, “Text, Symbols, and Frenchness”, in: JM H 57 (1975), pp. 682-95, esp. 
_ p. 690.
25P. Bourdieu, Entwurf einer Theorie der Praxis a u f der ethnologischen Grundlage der kabylischen 
Gesellschaft, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 146.
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The argument about labels
The terms “everyday life” (Alltag) and “experience” respectively refer 
only to certain aspects of the dual constitution of social reality that I have 
ju st described. “Everyday life” and the resultant label, “the history of every­
day life”, point to the constant reproduction of social realities and the fact 
that social realities are constructed day in, day out by interpretations and 
actions. In com m on with the first generation of historical social scientists, 
therefore, social historians working on the history of everyday life reject the 
lim itation o f research to specific or unusual events and extraordinary per­
sonalities. At the same time, however, there is a frequent misconception that 
the history of everday life is bound up with a concrete place, “the everyday”, 
which differs from other concrete realities. As with the term 'structure ', it is 
again possible to observe a tendency towards objectification and reification, 
in the sense that the way in which actions and interpretations appropriate 
circumstances (the modus operandi) is often objectified as a definite object 
(an opus operatum). Moreover, to rely on an actor’s “intuitive” knowledge 
and actions rem ains within the limits of the phenom enological mode of 
recognition. Therefore, many historians of everyday life have already moved 
onto a praxiological mode. They oscillate in hermeneutically analytical fash­
ion between the actors’ manifest and latent meanings and their structured 
circumstances.
W ithin the overall conception of the “history of everday life”, the “eve­
ryday” refers no t to any particular well-defined object, bu t instead to the 
analytical focus on social actors’ living and working relationships, and the 
ways in which those relationships are “experienced” (reception, interpreta­
tion, action etc.).26 W hat is more, the term frequently used as a synonym 
for the “history o f everyday life”, the “history of experience” (Erfahrungs­
geschichte) , also gives rise to misunderstanding. If this were interpreted ab­
solutely literally, it would refer to a sub-discipline dealing with social actors’ 
historical experiences. Yet experience -  the gradual building up of inter­
pretations, feelings and memories that accompanies social action -  consti­
tutes only one of the two aspects of social reality formation. The term, “his­
tory o f experience”, thus actually comprises neither the deeds and actions 
preceeding and accompanying experience, nor the external circumstances 
in which actors are located. To lose sight of the activities and conditions for 
action would m ean culturalistically reducing social historical reality to mere 
in terpretation, consciousness and mental processes.
26 See my discussion with A. Lüdtke, “Alltagsgeschichte. Zur Aneignung der Verhältnisse”, 
in: ÖZG2 (1991), 2, pp. 104-13.
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O f late, increasing numbers of social historians have tu rned  enthusi­
astically towards historical anthropology, a new label for which Rebekka 
Habermas and Nils Minkmar have recently tried to define a clear research 
paradigm (in the introduction to a volume of collected essays27). It is par­
ticularly noteworthy that they try to do so almost exclusively by differentiat­
ing themselves from “the history of everyday life” and “the history of m en­
talities”. W ithout at any point going into the historical and m ethodological 
variations or differences between these two approaches, they indiscriminately 
accuse them  of treating “people” as “objects determ ined by their m aterial 
conditions” and argue that historical anthropology should “strongly disso­
ciate” itself from such kinds of approach.28 Even if the criticism that Braudel’s 
Méditerranée (cited by Habermas and M inkmar as representative o f the his­
tory of mentalities) is overly deterministic is m ore or less justified, the same 
can certainly not be said for o ther exponents of the so-called “history o f 
mentalities”. Rather like historical anthropology, the latter is in practice so 
varied and at the same time so vaguely defined in social theoretical terms 
that the assertion, that it rests on determ inistic foundations, is certainly 
unjustified and implies a kind of uniformity which does no t actually exist.29 
Even m ore unjustified is the claim that leading historians o f the “history of 
everyday life” (such as Hans Medick and Alf Lüdtke30) are likewise overly 
deterministic, particularly when it is considered that it is precisely histori­
ans such as these who have sought most to avoid the pitfalls o f determ inism  
by employing the concepts of appropriation and social practices. After such 
strenuous efforts to distance themselves from other labels by accusing them
27 R. Haberm as and N. Minkmar (eds.), Das Schwein des Häuptlings. Sechs Aufsätze zur 
Historischen Anthropologie, Berlin 1992, pp. 7-19.
28 Ibid., p. 7 ff. Byway of contrast to H aberm as and Minkmar, Wolf Lepenies has written 
that the history o f mentalities stands at the very centre o f historical anthropological 
research. See: W. Lepenies, “Geschichte und  A nthropologie”, in: G G l (1975), p .331.
29 See: U. Raulff (ed.), Mentalitätengeschichte. Zur historischen Rekonstruktion geistiger Prozesse, 
Berlin 1989, esp. pp.7-15; P. H. Hutton, “Die Geschichte der M entalitäten. Eine andere 
Landkarte der Kulturgeschichte”, in: U. Raulff (ed.), Vom Umschreiben der Geschichte. 
Neue historische Perspektiven, Berlin 1986, pp. 103-31; E. Schulin, “Geistesgeschichte, 
Intellectual History und Histoire des M entalités seit der Jah rhundertw ende”, in: 
idem, Traditionskritik und Rekonstruktionsversuch, G öttingen 1979, pp. 144-62.
30 See: A. Lüdtke (ed.), Alltagsgeschichte. Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und 
Lebensweisen, Frankfurt 1989, esp. the in troduction  and the rep rin t o f an influential 
article by H. Medick, ‘“Missionare im R uderboot’? E thnologische Erkenntnisweisen 
als H erausforderung  an die Sozialgeschichte”, p p .48-84. Both articles con tain  
fundam ental statements about the “history of everyday life”, which in fact coincide in 
many points of detail with the conception of historical anthropology proposed by 
Haberm as and Minkmar.
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of determ inism , Haberm as and Minkmar only succeed in ending up at the 
po in t which the “history o f everyday life” (Alltagsgeschichte) has already 
reached: thus we learn that historical anthropology (Historische Anthropologie) 
deals with “social processes as a form of interaction between structures on 
the one hand and perceptions, interpretations and actions on the o ther”.31 
So where exactly does historical anthropology differ from the history of everday 
life? Do they both have the same program after all?
I have in fact found little or no difference amongst authors who have writ­
ten conceptual pieces on historical anthropology. André Burguiere has described 
those French social historians interested in the qualitative methods used for 
analysing “systems of representation” as “historical anthropologists”, as opposed 
to the numerous historians (including a great many in and around the Annales 
school) who have devoted themselves to the investigation of the “serial sources” 
to be found in rural history, demographic history and so on. Burguiere thus 
considers Marc Bloch’s Les Rois thaumaturges 32 and Georges Duby’s study of 
demonstrative profligacy in the high middle ages33 to belong to the field of 
historical anthropology. But couldn ’t we equally as j ustifiably consider these works 
to be part of the history of everday life, rather like numerous other examples 
of French social history dealing with social, economic, religious and political 
relationships in a particular region and their appropriation by historical ac­
tors? Burguiere himself is reluctant to describe historical anthropology as an 
“independent branch of historical research”.34 Michael Mitteraurer, for exam­
ple, confines die anthropological side of his research on the history of the fam­
ily to social history’s interdisciplinary contact with “social anthropology, ethnol­
ogy” and the “individual ethnographies of different European countries”, to­
gether with themes “which can be broadly understood as anthropological, in 
that they are of fundamental relevance to research on the family”.35 What is 
more, Anthony Giddens rightly points out that “any form of social research” 
possesses “a cultural anthropological aspect”.36
Historical anthropology would not therefore appear to be a clearly de­
fined field of historical science, distinguishable from the other mentioned la­
bels in terms of questions, theory or method.37 Moreover, there is nothing very
31 H aberm as and M inkm ar (eds.), Das Schwein des Häuptlings, p. 9.
32 M. Bloch, Les Rois thaumaturges, Paris 1961.
33 G. Duby, Guerriers et Paysans, Paris 1974, German: Krieger und Bauern, Frankfurt 1977.
34 A. Burguiere, “Historische Anthropologie”, in: J. Le Goff et al. (eds.), Die Rückeroberung 
des historischen Denkens, Frankfurt 1990, pp. 62-101.
35 M. M itteraurer, Historisch-anthropologische Familienforschung,Wien 1990, p. 16.
36 Giddens, Konstitution der Gesellschaft, p. 338.
37 H. W under com es to  the  same conclusion in: K ulturgeschichte, M entalitäten­
geschichte, H istorische A nthropologie, in: R. van Dülmen (ed.), Fischer Lexikon 
Geschichte, 2nd edition, Frankfurt 1990, p. 80.
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new about the aim of looking at European history through social or cultural 
anthropological eyes.38 However, if one wants to make an impact or stake a 
claim in the academic world, it is necessary to present what one is doing 
under a new label. We are thus dealing with a kind o f conceptual slogan, 
which -  like the terms “history of everyday life” or the “history o f experi­
ence” -  is intended to help force through a cultural theoretical change within 
social history. If there is one thing that various attem pts to form ulate an 
historical cultural anthropological m ethodology have in com m on, it is un ­
doubtedly the employment of the praxiological m ode of knowledge m en­
tioned above. That, however, is something that historical anthroplogy shares 
in common with the history of everyday life and micro-history, wom en’s and 
gender history, ethnographers who in terp re t their discipline as an histori­
cal cultural science39 and post-structural variations o f ethno-history,40 to 
m ention only the historical disciplines within the social sciences.
Be that as it may, by no means all practitioners o f historical an thropol­
ogy adhere to the post-structural, praxiological maxims implicit in the dia­
lectical analysis of conditions for action and social practices. Some o f their 
num ber have not followed the post-structural trend, keeping instead within 
the structuralist tradition o f Lévi-Strauss.41 O thers are unab le  to apply 
praxiological maxims, because they remove marriage, birth, family, death, 
nutrition, etc. from their immediate socio-cultural or socio-economic con­
text, such that they are studied as isolated phenom ena and  subjected to 
sweeping comparisons with o ther societies and continents,42 similar to the
38 Com pare the extensive bibliography in: U. Daniel, „Kultur“ und  „Gesellschaft“, pp. 
82; M. Sahlins, Inseln der Geschichte, Frankfurt 1992; N. Z. Davis, “Die M öglichkeiten 
d e r  V ergangenheit. G eschichte u n d  E th n o lo g ie : N eue B licke au f v e r tra u te  
Landschaften”, in: Raulff (ed.), Vom Umschreiben der Geschichte, pp. 45-53.
39 See: W. Kaschuba and C. Lipp, Dörfliches Überleben. Zur Geschichte materieller und sozialer 
Reproduktion ländlicher Gesellschaft im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert, T übingen 1982; W. 
Kaschuba, Lebenswelt und Kultur der unterbürgerlichen Schichten im 19. und 20. Jh., 
M ünchen 1990; idem, Volkskultur zwischen feudaler und bürgerlicher Gesellschaft. Zur 
Geschichte eines Begriffs und seiner gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit, F rankfurt 1988, esp. p. 31; 
R. van Dülmen and N. Schindler (eds.), Volkskultur. Zur Wiederentdeckung des vergessenen 
Alltags, Frankfurt 1984.
49 See: KR. W ernhart und W. Zips, “Ethnohistoire und  Kulturgeschichte. Diskussion 
der theoretischen und  m ethodologischen G rundlagen”, in: W. Schmied-Kowarzik 
andj. Stagl (eds.), Grundfragen der Ethnologie. Beiträge zur gegenwärtigen Theorie-Diskussion, 
2ncl edition, Berlin 1993, pp. 259 and 264.
41 For an in troduction , see: A. H onneth , “Ein struk tu ralistischer Rousseau. Zur 
Anthropologie von C. Lévi-Strauss”, in: idem, Die zerrissene Welt des Sozialen, pp. 93-112.
42 Com pare th e  criticism m ade by J. Kocka, “H istorisch-an thropologische F rage­
stellungen -  ein Defizit der Historischen Sozialwissenschaft? T hesen zur Diskussion”, 
in: H. Süssmuth (ed.), Historische Anthropologie, G öttingen 1984, p. 77: “In o rd er to
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way as the doctrine of cultural circles (Kulturkreislehre) was employed in the 
nascent ethnology of the start of the century.43
It is no t easy to define the relationship between the concept of the his­
tory o f society ( Gesellschaftsgeschichte) and the terms just mentioned, because 
there are a num ber of contradictory conceptual definitions in existence. In 
the in troduction to his History of German Society, Hans-Ulrich Wehler form u­
lates a program  for a “socio-structural” history of m odern German society 
and the “changing impact of economy, power, culture and the social inequali­
ties which go to make up that society”.44 For W ehler’s pupils, however, the 
term Gesellschaftsgeschichte defines a much broader church, under whose roof 
it should be possible to “integrate” the history of everyday life, historical 
anthropology, womens’ and gender history, the history of mentalities, a new 
interpretation o f political history and the history of ideas, and even a “his­
toricism redefined for the present day”.45 If this were really the case, then 
the term  Gesellschaftsgeschichte (history of society) would serve no other pur­
pose than to act as a short-hand for the sum total of quantificatory and in­
terpretative approaches belonging to the historical social sciences.
In practice, terms like history of experience, history of everday life, 
historical anthropology or history of society (in so far as it is not conceived 
of as a catch-all concep t), are fairly indistinguishable, more or less inter­
changeable rallying cries. Like all rallying cries, they have their logical weak­
nesses and give rise to misunderstandings. There are nonetheless good rea­
sons for continuing to employ terms like history of everyday life, due to their
bring out particular aspects of a situation or forms of behaviour which change only 
very slowly, broadly extended conceptions of space and tim e are employed, which 
almost necessarily means that social phenom ena (for example, such as youth protest) 
are taken utterly out of the ir specific historical context (societal, cultural, political 
and so on), thereby automatically ignoring the usual strictures and rules implicit in 
historical analysis. For this reason, the approach conflicts with certain key principles 
of historical social science (above all, the im portance of context and basic historical 
m ethodology).”
43 See K. E. Müller, “Grundzüge des ethnologischen Historismus”, in: Schmied-Kowarzik 
and Stagl (eds.), Grundfragen der Ethnologie, pp. 197-232, esp. p. 202.
44 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Bd. 1: Vom Feudalismus des Alten Reiches 
bis zur Defensiven M odernisierung der Reformära 1700-1915, M ünchen 1987, esp. 
P P -M 2 .
M. H ettling  et al. (eds.), Was ist Gesellschaftsgeschichte?M ünchen 1991, Vorwort, pp. 9- 
10; see also: H. Wunder, Kulturgeschichte, Mentalitätengeschichte, Historische Anthropologie, 
a n d j .  Mooser, “W irtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte, Historische Sozialwissenschaft”, 
in: R. van Dülm en (ed .) , Fischer Lexikon Geschichte, pp. 65-85 and pp. 86-101, esp. 101: 
„Die Gesellschaftsgeschichte ist daher angewiesen auf die Kulturgeschichte und 
Historische A nthropologie, ebenso wie auf die Politische Geschichte“.
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function as a kind of signal enabling us to point to the neglect of social actors’ 
perspectives and actions in the more objectivist variants of social history and 
the “history of society”. If these efforts eventually achieve their aim -  and a 
num ber of signs indicate that they will -  then the battle slogans themselves 
will become obsolete. Having become “sociologised” in the 1970s and 1980s, 
social history will thus be expanded into an historical social and cultural sci­
ence. Historical actors’ viewpoints will be integrated into social historical re­
search in a way that has long been true for social structures (incidentally, the 
latter being a shift that occurred without the label “social history” being re­
placed by “structural history”, as W erner Conze once suggested should hap­
pen) . At the same time, it is only to be expected that new labels will repeat­
edly crop up in the future, in order to mark out new territories and proclaim 
one’s own approach as “new”, “nouvelle” or “neu”, in contrast to well-estab­
lished approaches. Social science achieves its dynamic as a societal institution 
not least through the constant struggle between those already in possession 
of jobs and positions and those striving after them, as well as the respective 
efforts of such groups to build up power and influence by form ing research 
groups and methodological schools. But unfortunately, academic self-repro­
duction has -  up until now -  not been subjected to the same careful examina­
tion as that which is applied to the subject-matter of social science, a fact that 
necessitates critical reflection about the latter’s programmatic statements and 
the labels it employs.46 In my opinion, the frequentiy confusing impact o f the
-  often quite aggressive -  use of rallying cries is carried out for reasons of 
academic politics, in order to establish differences between certain groups 
and to exclude others. On closer inspection, however, most of these differ­
ences prove to be unsubstantiated both in terms of social scientific theory and 
the actual history of the disciplines concerned.
A return to narratives without theory ?
Members of the first generation o f historical social scientists have re­
peatedly accused the history of everyday life and the history o f experience 
as “completely lacking in theory” and its practitioners of being “hostile to 
theory”,47 and it can be supposed that the same accusations will be levelled
46 See: P. Bourdieu, Homo academicus, Frankfurt 1988; idem, “Narzißtische Reflexivität 
und wissenschaftliche Reflexivität”, in: E. Berg and M. Fuchs (eds.), Kultur, soziale 
Praxis, Text. Die Krise der ethnographischen Repräsentation, F rankfurt 1993, pp. 365-74.
47 See J. Kocka, “Zurück zur Erzählung? Plädoyer für historische A rgum entation”, in: 
GG10 (1984), pp. 395-408; idem, “Klassen oder Kultur? D urchbrüche und  Sackgassen 
in der A rbeitergeschichte”, in: Merkur 36 (1982), pp. 955-65.
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against the proponents of historical anthropology. Admittedly, there are a 
few historians am ongst those choosing workers, peasants, serfs and slaves 
as their subjects who claim to get by without employing any theory. But a 
good proportion  o f social historians interested in the history of the everday 
life, historical anthropology and so on, base their approach precisely on 
the above-m entioned social theories pertaining to the dual constitution of 
social reality.48 Hostility to theory is thus directed only at those theories which 
adhere to objectivistic paradigms. On the basis of their criticism of both the 
one-dimensionality of structural functionalism and culturalistic narrowness, 
the new generation of social historians has been able to develop a more 
advanced theoretical understanding.
Accusations as to lack o f theory are closely bound up with talk about a 
lapse back into historical narrative (which also lacks theory). This has stimu­
lated a highly productive debate and, above all, has illustrated that the crea­
tion o f a binary opposition between narrative and explanation misses the 
poin t about the very nature of historical scientific discourse. O r as Roger 
Chartier has form ulated the problem, the specificity of historical knowledge 
consists “in the narrative and the construction of that narrative”; the degree 
of historical intelligibility is m easured by the plausibility of the given narra­
tive.49 Jö rn  Rüsen has argued in much the same way. For him, narrative is 
no th ing  less than the actual means by which historical explanation takes 
place, on condition that the narrative goes beyond the purely mimetic to a 
level o f construction which is then testable, reflective and theorising.50 The 
accusation that the history of everyday life or the new cultural history repre­
sents nothing m ore than a lapse into narrative without theory proves unten­
able, because it relies on an artificial dichotomy between narrative and 
explanation and refuses to confine its criticism to particular authors who 
are in fact decidely anti theoretical in their approach. In all its various shapes 
and sizes, be it structural analytical, qualifica to ry  or qualitative, the writ­
ing o f history is inherently narrative in form because it is always based on 
the construction of links in time and space, which cannot be presented in
48 Above all, see: Lüdtke, “Einleitung, and Medick, ‘Missionare im R uderboot’?” both 
in: A. Lüdtke (ed.), Alltagsgeschichte; R. Sieder, “Zur Theoriebedürftigkeit der Neuen 
Alltagsgeschichte”, in: H. Nagl-Docekal and F. Wimmer (eds.), Neue Ansätze in der 
Geschichtswissenschaft, W ien 1984, pp. 24-41.
49 R. Chartier, Die unvollendete Vergangenheit. Geschichte und die Macht der Weltauslegung, 
Berlin 1989, p. 35.
50 J. Rüsen, Zeit und Sinn. Strategien historischen Denkens, Frankfurt 1990; for a criticism of 
Rüsen, see: R. Possekel, “Die W idersprüche der Geschichtswissenschaft. Überlegungen 
zuJörn  Rüsens H istorik”, in: ÖZG4 (1993), pp. 479-91.
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any other way than by narrative explanation. Seen from  this point o f view, 
historical argum entation -  which, as Jü rgen  Kocka has emphasised, rep re­
sents the distinctive, excursive style of historical social science -  constitutes 
one of several different types of textual forms within historiographical nar­
rative, along with description, evaluation, num eration and so on. The main 
thing for social historians -  and especially those concerned with the history 
of everyday life or interested in cultural anthropological approaches — to 
learn from this debate is that they m ust avoid placing a naive trust in the 
directness o f mimetic approaches. The desire to be the m outhpiece of the 
“voiceless” oppressed, as was constantly proclaim ed in the nascent phase of 
“the history of everyday life”, potentially ignores the constructive, fictional 
elem ent in historiographical narrative and averts the focus onto the ideals, 
processes of idealisation, norms and values that are thereby set in m otion.51
Some methodological consequences
A num ber of methodological conclusions m ust be drawn from  these 
theoretical considerations. The first and most basic o f these is that -  in their 
absence -  we must empirically investigate historical actors’ viewpoints by 
analysing in a social scientific m anner those texts which record relevant state­
ments on their part. That is equally as true for the in terpretation o f surviv­
ing texts (such as diaries, autobiographies, travelogues, police reports) as it 
is for texts generated during the research process itself, as is the case with 
the technique of narrative or other kinds of interview. The problem s of text 
analysis raise the question as to how historical actors’ interpretations and 
actions can be understood and explained when the researcher belongs to 
another time, another society and to o ther systems of knowledge, belief, 
sensibility and certainties. If culture is understood in accordance with our 
hypothesis concerning the dual construction of social reality, then it follows 
that culture is also produced by social actors’ daily activities, ra ther than 
simply being a system of given symbols, norms and values that are external 
and pre-existing for each member of society. Every culture is thus bound up 
with a specific life-world, through which it is created in praxi and for practi­
cal purposes. If, however, we want to study a past life-world, we are obliged
-  nolens volens -  to take up the position of observer. Bourdieu has argued 
that ethnologists and anthropologists are frequently in danger of becoming 
culture-centric because of their theoretical standpoints and reflexive distance
51 On the fictional character of historical writing, see: V. Biti, “G eschichte als L iteratur”.
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from the field of investigation.52 That is undoubtedly a criticism that can also 
be applied to social historians, given that the surviving textual sources are 
even less likely to provide counter-arguments to the researcher’s interpreta­
tion than the living subjects studied by ethnologists and anthropologists. If 
a contem porary life-world is to be studied, we can enter into a communica­
tive relationship with its participants, and thus ourselves become virtual 
participants in this foreign life-world.53 This can result in a lengthy (and only 
partly successful) “second socialisation” process, in which we are gradually 
able to accum ulate experience of the rules, meanings and characteristics of 
the life-world in question. In most social historical research, however, it is 
usually the case that the life-world no longer exists: all that remains are written 
or oral narratives, data, objects and pictures. This greatly widened episte­
mological gap forces us to recognise the different characteristics of the past 
life-world and to draw methodological consequences from that fact. The 
Italian social historian Carlo Ginzburg has gone so far to develop a radical 
maxim on this basis: “The fundam ental technique of research is that of dis­
tancing oneself from the subject-matter, the ability to make things seem dis­
tan t and  incom prehensible -  and not the o ther way round, as historians 
usually try and do. Historians frequently turn to the past with a purely ret­
rospective projection of how the past m ight have been, [...] in a way that 
does n o t see or seek out what is different, but on the contrary, excessively 
strives after identification with the past!”54
The fact that everything cultural is inherentiy bound up with signs (sym­
bols) implies that in methodological terms, we should make sense of these 
signs by processing them  herm eneutically  and analytically. Moreover, 
G inzburg’s hypothesis about the different nature of past cultures means that 
historical science’s traditional hermeneutic approach is no longer sufficient. 
Historicism was prem ised upon the idea that there was one single history of 
humanity, whose m eaning could be concluded from the historian’s intuitive 
in terpretation o f the sources.55 However, cultural anthropologists and so­
cial historians influenced by them no longer assume that they share one and
52 Bourdieu, Theorie der Praxis, p. 142.; idem, Sozialer Sinn. Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft, 
F rankfurt 1987, p. 63.
53 See:J. H aberm as, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Bd. 1, Frankfurt 1981, p. 63.
54 C. Ginzburg, “Geschichte und  Geschichten. Ü ber Archive, M arlene Dietrich und  die 
Lust an der G eschichte”, in: idem, Spurensicherungen. Uber verborgene Geschichte, Kunst 
und soziales Gedächtnis, Berlin 1983, p. 22.
55 For a critique o f Germ an historicism ’s basic theory of knowledge and philosophy of 
history, see: W.J. Mommsen, Die Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Historismus, Düsseldorf 
1971; idem, “G eschichte als Historische Sozialwissenschaft”, in: P. Rossi (ed.), Theorie 
der modernen Geschichtsschreibung, Frankfurt 1987, pp. 107-46.
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the same world with the actors who form the subject-matter of their research. 
The more historians open themselves up to the viewpoints o f historical ac­
tors, the m ore it becomes clear that those actors’ perspectives belong to 
different life-worlds, or to put it another way, occupy a different horizon of 
meaning.56 It is therefore necessary to recognise that we can no longer trust 
in a comm on horizon of meaning, as Dilthey and o ther “herm eneutic  ide­
alists”57 did. Nor can we draw conclusions about historical actors’ experi­
ences on the basis o f our own experiences, “imagine ourselves” to be in the 
same situation as people in the past, or trust in an almost secretive kind of 
“intuitive understanding”. That would inevitably lead to our projecting onto 
the past the experiences and interpretations form ed in our own life-world 
and transposing them to different life-worlds.
Yet what o ther methodological alternatives are open to us? As long as 
we dispose of texts that allow us to reconstruct the viewpoints and experi­
ences o f  h isto rica l ac to rs, we a re  ab le  to  em p lo y  a sy stem atica lly  
reconstructive hermeneutic-analytical approach. By this I m ean form s o f 
text analysis which analyse the multi-layered, context dependen t natu re  o f 
texts (and to a certain extent, visual images as well) as precisely as possi­
ble, in away that reconstructs the original narrative along the lines o f how 
it originated in the past.58 W hether it be an oral narrative, a diary entry, 
court record  or whatever, the text will be treated  as the protocol o f a par­
56 The term  “life-world” derives from the phenom enological sociology o f the 1930s and 
1940s (E. Husserl and A. Schütz) and becam e com monly used in social history in the 
1980s, opposing the dom inance o f structu ra l functionalism . In con trast to  its 
phenomenological meaning (i.e. the subject’s “horizon of m eaning”) , social historians 
frequently equate “life-world” with local o r regional societies. In doing so, however, 
they lose both the constitutive m eaning of life-world, which is bound  up with the way 
actors’ interpret and make sense of their life-world, and the m ethodological necessity 
o f exploring the entirety of its m eaning th rough interpretive social science m ethods. 
On the phenom enological concept o f “life-world”, see: A. Gurwitsch, “Problem s of 
the Life-World”, in: M. Natanson (ed.), Phenomenology and Social Reality. Essays in 
memory of A. Schütz, Den Haag 1970, pp. 53-61; A. Schütz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der 
sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie, F rankfurt 1974; B. W aldenfels, 
In den Netzen der Lebenswelt, Frankfurt 1985; R. Grathoff, Milieu und Lebenswelt. Einführung 
in die phänomenologische Soziologie und die sozialphänomenologische Forschung, Frankfurt 
1989. On the sociologisation of the concept, see: Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen 
Handelns-, for a critique thereof, compare: A. Linkenbach, Opake Gestalten des Denkens. 
J. Habermas und die Rationalität fremder Lebensformen, M ünchen 1986.
5 7 W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Frankfurt
1981.
58 An overview of reconstructive analytical m ethods as they have developed up until 
now is provided by: Lamnek, Qualitative Sozialforschung, vol. II.
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ticular action ,59 and in terp reted  in accordance with our social historical 
knowledge of its context (contrary to the purely textual models of interpre­
tation employed by linguistics) .60 In this kind of text analysis, subjects actu­
ally come into view as actors, that is to say that their interpretations are not 
treated independently  o f their actions or conditions for action, just as the 
conditions for action are always viewed in connection with their appropria­
tion by historical actors.61
In doing so, it is necessary to consider that the possibility for individu­
als to change a given situation through social action exists up to a certain 
point, bu t this is som ething often only available to social groups, who can 
coordinate their actions to a particular end and define a common goal on 
the basis of com m on interests (which does not necessarily mean that that 
goal will always be achieved). If we speak about actors in Bourdieu’s sense 
o f the term, then  we do no t really mean individuals acting alone, but rather, 
people who exist and act in communicative and interactive relationships. 
O r to pu t it m ore precisely, the actor is our intellectual construction, through 
which we hope to express accurately aspects of an historical person who 
com m unicated and acted in concert with others. At the same time, it seems 
worthwhile -  wherever possible -  to take individual actors as case studies,
5 9 H.-G. Soeffner, “Prämissen e iner sozialwissenschaftlichen H erm eneutik”, in: idem. 
Auslegung des Alltags -  Der Alltag der Auslegung. Zur wissenssoziologischen Konzeption einer 
sozialwissenschaftlichen Hermeneutik, Frankfurt 1989, pp. 66-97.
60 For attem pts at this kind o f textual interpretation, see my articles, ‘“Vater, derf i 
aufstehn?’ C hildhood experiences in Viennese working-class families around 1900”, 
in: Continuity and Change 1 (1996)1, pp.53-88; “A H itler Youth from a Respectable 
Family: The Narrative Composition and Deconstruction of a Life Story”, in: D. Bertaux 
and P. Thom pson (eds.), Between Generations. Family Models, Myths and Memories, Oxford 
1993, pp. 99-120; “Freisetzung und  Bindung. Eine Fallstudie zu aktuellen Dynamiken 
im Ehe- und  Fam ilienleben”, in: J. Ehm er et al. (eds.), Historische Familienforschung. 
Ergebnisse und Kontroversen, Michael Mitterauer zum 60. Geburtstag, Frankfurt and New 
York 1997, pp. 229-255.
61 Com pare the technique applied by Gabriele Rosenthal for the sequential analysis of 
data and texts. By adapting the ideas developed by F. Schütze and U. Oevermann, 
Rosenthal essentially takes two main analytical steps: firstly, the analysis of what the 
au th o r of the text wants to say, and secondly, the experim ental weighing up of all 
possible m eanings (Lesarten) that are additionally conceivable. The systematic 
investigation of the differences between the intended and latent sense of a text seems 
to  be one way o f acknowledging the cultural difference between historical actors 
and the scientific in terpretation  of their statements, as well as o f employing that 
difference heuristically in the search for historical scientific tru th  (which is always a 
tru th  concerned with difference). See: G. Rosenthal, Erlebte und erzählte Lebensgeschichte. 




in order to side-step the frequent pit-fall of structural functionalist social 
history whereby social groups, collectivities and classes are ontologised as 
“the family”, “the household”, “the workforce”, “the proletariat”, “the bour­
geoisie” etc.. By avoiding the attribution of collective characteristics to such 
groups prior to the research actually taking place, as well as the tem ptation 
to smooth over the internal differences within a group (e.g. between m en 
and women, young people and adults, skilled and unskilled workers and so 
on), it is possible for us to undertake a full social historical investigation on 
the basis of analytical case-studies, thus improving the empirical quality of 
our research. In other words, our hypotheses and argum ents will be tied to 
an analysis of empirically reconstructed cases, which can then be tested by 
comparison with o ther cases and examples.62
Admittedly, there are a num ber of im p o rtan t questions for which 
there are no, or hardly any, relevant surviving statem ents from  histo ri­
cal actors, and without there being any possibility of generating statem ents 
by m eans o f interviews, because the interval o f tim e is simply too great. 
In such instances, we only dispose o f statem ents about the actors, be they 
from the side o f the authorities, contem porary  observers, o r proto-soci­
ologists, such as the society writers o f the 18th and  19th centuries. These 
texts can be subjected to discourse analysis, which is still able to trea t 
the tex t’s au thor as an em pirical case-study, even if it is unab le  to do so 
for the actual actors themselves. T he a u th o r’s interests, social position, 
education etc. m ust be reconstructed with the greatest possible atten tion  
to detail, in o rder for that text to be “deconstructed” and  for the obser­
vations and  claims m ade about “the bourgeo isie”, “the peasan ts”, “the 
peop le”, and  so on, to be in te rp re ted  as contextually  d e p e n d en t social 
actions with their own particular perspectives.
This does no t necessarily m ean stopping at the construction o f case- 
studies: a num ber of cases can be com pared, and  the typology resulting  
from  that com parison (whether systematic or unsystem atic) can provide 
insights in to  the actual workings o f specific periods and  cultures. This
62 It is often claimed that such a high level o f em pirical accuracy can only be attained by 
social historians working on near-contem porary history, because they are able to 
employ qualitative research techniques, such as narrative interviews. However, it is 
also the case that sources from much m ore historically removed periods can be 
successfully analysed in terms of the dialectic between conditions for action and 
social practices, as some stimulating works on the social history of the early m odern 
period have shown. See, for example: E. Landsteiner, “Einen Bären an b in d en ”, in: 
ÖZG 4 (1993), pp. 218-52; M ichael S to lberg , ‘“ M ein äskulap isches O ra k e l!’ 
Patientenbriefe als Quelle einer Kulturgeschichte d er R rankheitserfahrung im 18. 
Ja h rh u n d ert”, in: ÖZG7 (1996), pp. 385-404; and many others.
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case-study and  com parative typlogy based approach has in fact already 
been  em ployed in many fields of interpretative social history. Social his­
torians have tried  to use case-studies in their research on the history of 
social groups (such as a factory work-force63), socio-cultural milieus (for 
exam ple, you th  g roups engaged  in political resistance in the T h ird  
R eich64), village m icro-societies,65 means of survival in National Socialist 
concentration camps,66 and the political behaviour and everyday experiences 
o f particular generations or social classes,67 to name but a few. Social scien­
tific biographical research should also be included here, given that it occu­
pies an interdisciplinary m iddle-ground between sociology and social his­
tory and is concerned with the detailed reconstruction of individual lifestories, 
which can then  be contrasted , com pared and presented  in typological 
form .68
Contrary to the claims made by its critics, all these variants of a cul­
tural scientifically expanded social history do not represent a conception 
opposing historical social science (Historische Sozialwissenschaft). They are 
very m uch a part of historical social science, albeit one which avoids reduc-
63 See, fo r exam ple: I. Bauer, “Tschikweiber haunt's uns g ’nennt...” Frauenleben und, 
Frauenarbeit an der „Peripherie“: Die Halleiner Zigarrenfabriksarbeiterinnen 1869 bis 1940. 
Eine historische Fallstudie a u f der Basis lebensgeschichtlicher Interviews, Wien 1988.
64 See, for example: Ch. Gerbel, A. Mejstrik, R. Sieder, “Die ‘Schlurfs’. Verweigerung 
und  Opposition von W iener Arbeiterjugendlichen im ‘Dritten Reich’”, in: E. Talos et 
al. (eds.), NS-Herrschaft in Österreich, Wien 1988, pp .243-68.
65 See, for example: D. Sabean, Power in the Blood. Village Discourse in Early Modem Germany, 
Cam bridge 1985; German: Das zweischneidige Schwert. Herrschaft und Widerspruch im 
Württemberg der frühen Neuzeit, Berlin 1986; idem, Property, Production, and Family in 
Neckarshausen, 1700-1870, Cambridge 1990; R. Beck, Unterfinning. Ländliche Welt vor 
Anbruch der Moderne, M ünchen 1993.
66 A m ong others, see: M. Pollak, Die Grenzen des Sagbaren. Lebensgeschichten von KZ- 
Uberlebenden als Augenzeugenberichte und als Identitätsarbeit, Frankfurt 1988.
67 See: L. N ietham m er (ed.), “DieJahre weiß man nicht, wo man die heute hinsetzen soll”. 
Faschismus-Erfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet, Bonn 1983; idem and A. von Plato (eds.), ”Wir 
kriegen jetzt andere Zeiten”, Bonn 1985; L. N ietham m er et al. (eds.), Die volkseigene 
Erfahrung: Eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industrieprovinz der DDR Berlin 1991; L. 
Passerini (ed .), Memory and Totalitarianism, Oxford 1992; idem, Torino operaia efascismo, 
Roma 1984; English: Facism in Popular Memory, Cambridge 1987.
68 For biographical studies relating to research on the Third Reich, see: G. Rosenthal 
(ed .), Die Hitlerjugend-Generation. Biographische Thematisierung als Vergangenheits­
bewältigung, Essen 1986; idem, “Als der Krieg kam,, hatte ich mit Hitler nichts mehr zu tu n ”. 
Zur Gegenwärtigkeit des “Dritten Reiches”in Biographien, Opladen 1990; idem, “Wenn alles 
in Scherben fä llt...” Von Leben und Sinnwelt der Kriegsgeneration, Opladen 1987; W. Fischer- 
Rosenthal et al. (eds.), Biographien in Deutschland, Opladen 1994; a comprehensive 
bibliograpy is given in: BIOS 1 (1988) and 2 (1989).
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ing its subject-matter either objectivistically (to the external conditions for 
social action and interpretation) or subjectivistically (to “lived experience”). 
It is not the case -  as is all too often asserted -  that this form of social history 
abruptly swaps subjective viewpoints for objective structures. Instead, as I 
have tried to show, it investigates the dialectical connection between structured 
conditions for action and social practices, which structurise relationships 
within certain social spaces.
In view of the overwhelming occupation of the “social” by structural 
functionalism, it seems to me an interesting strategic question as to w hether 
we should consider returning to the term  “culture” -  m uch as it was used as 
a conceptual battle slogan in the late 19th century, as a means of com bating 
the primacy of the political -  and term the approach outlined above histori­
cal cultural science. Ute Daniel has pu t this subject up for discussion, whilst 
simultaneously showing just how much the concept of “culture” has changed 
since the earliest attempts to formulate approaches to cultural history in the 
18th century.69 From today’s perspective, for example, cultural history as 
practised by someone like Karl Lam precht seems too objectivistic and heav­
ily influenced by psychological theory, tha t o f au thors such as Breysig, 
Toynbee or Morgan as overly evolutionistic in approach, and the works of 
Jacob Burckhardt too narrow in scope.70 It is nevertheless necessary for 
historical science to engage with these older approaches, if it is to overcome 
different configurations of objectivism, idealism and culturalism and move 
in the direction of a putative historical cultural and social science. After all, 
it is only possible to overcome what has first been acknowledged as neces­
sary to be overcome.
Trends and future perspectives.
By way o f conclusion, I would like to discuss the future perspectives that 
are opened up for social history by the adoption o f the praxiological m ode 
of research outlined above and its move in the direction o f an historical
69 Daniel, “Kultur”und, “Gesellschaft”.
70 For some im portant comments on this topic, see the still relevant discussion by: T. 
Nipperdey, “K ulturgeschichte, Sozialgeschichte, h istorische A n th ropo log ie”, in: 
Vierteljahrsschrift fü r  Wirtschafts- und  Sozialgeschichte 55 (1968); id em , “D ie 
anthropologische Dim ension der Geschichtsw issenschaft”, in: G. Schulz (ed .), 
Geschichte heute, Göttingen 1973, pp. 225-55; see also: Daniel, “Kultur” und “Gesellschaft”, 
p. 84.
280
Social History: on the Way to Becoming a Historical Cultural Science?
cultural science. W hat changes have been displayed in the theoretical con­
ception and planning o f social historical research?
A social history which interprets itself as an historical cultural science 
cannot proceed in a culture-centric fashion, but will be obliged to recog­
nise a plurality of cultures and the respective differences between them, based 
on the different social logics constructed by their constituent actors. In ad­
dition, social history will no longer appear to be gender-neutral, but will 
take gender relations as one of its central themes in any given area of research, 
reflecting as it m ust the impact of the researcher’s own gender on the inves­
tigation, interpretation and analysis of historical texts, pictures and data.
Cultural scientific social historians are in a position to break with the 
universalistic categories (“m an” or “people”, “the world”, “reason” etc.) of 
idealisdc, male-dominated historical science, insofar as they thematicise both 
their own standpoints and social interests and those o f the historical actors 
they are investigating (which does not mean that they are obliged to lose 
themselves in those viewpoints!). When seen in this light the hegelian and 
marxist conception o f a historical meta-narrative, which tells history in the 
form of hum anity’s gradual emancipation, appears as an unconscious and 
unthinking interpretative framework for the historiography of “the m odern”. 
The teleological conception inherent in this meta-narrative might thus be 
replaced by a plurality of histories possessing open-ended futures. In doing 
this, however, social historians will no longer be able to conceive of their 
own role as a normative one (in the tradition of the “late Enlightenm ent”), 
whose evaluations of historical processes have recourse to a universal sense 
of m eaning attached to hum an action.71 In practical and moral terms, this 
form of social history undoubtedly can have a thoroughly political, emanci­
patory impact, as long as it provokes discussion about the actions, experi­
ences and interests of social groups, classes and genders, together with the 
different forms and scope of power exercised by historical actors. Metaphori­
cally speaking, this kind of social history will not be speaking over people’s 
heads. The investigation of historical actors’ appropriation of relationships
71 Representatives o f a “late E nlightenm ent”, such as Jürgen Haberm as or Jö rn  Rüsen, 
see themselves as obliged to refer to a totality, which can be defined as the utopie 
end-product o f a successful discourse. In my opinion, this has been justifiably criticised 
from the feminist and cultural scientific standpoint as a “utopie pre-creational scenario” 
and an academ ic vision of free dialogue relating to those obligatorily interested in 
knowledge. See: P. Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, vol. I, Frankfurt 1983, p. 47. 
For a fem inist critique, com pare the contribution by J. Held and U. Frevert in the 
volum e by j. Rüsen et al. (eds.), Die Zukunft der Aufklärung, Frankfurt 1988.
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and circumstances brings their actions, interpretations, ideas and physical 
experiences to the fore.
Ever since the first attempts at defining and practising social history, 
there has been a tendency to focus on the regional and local level. This is 
mainly due to the more intense empirical nature of social historical research 
and will probably increase with the proliferation of m ore culturally scien­
tific oriented works. However, the régionalisation of research them es does 
not exclude their being brought together into com pilation volumes for the 
purposes of providing overviews and m aking comparisons over a broader 
area. Nonetheless, it does present specific problems. Chief am ong these is 
that the increasing variety of theoretical approaches and m ethods increases 
the likelihood of results that are incom patible for comparative purposes. 
For that reason, theoretical discussion am ong researchers and agreem ent 
over the meaning of concepts, terminology and m ethods employed, will be 
that much more important, particularly between specialist researchers and 
those presenting comparative synopses of social historical research.
The current trend should also lead away from  deductive or inductive 
closed, hom ogeneous “grand theories” towards the construction o f hypoth­
eses with m ore m odest theo re tica l claim s, w hich are  s tim u la ted  an d  
abductively developed by the data and texts.72 In place of puristic attem pts 
to keep the old grand theories intact has come an ever m ore positively evalu­
ated eclecticism. Historical interpretations prem ised upon continuity and 
coherence will decline in im portance in the face o f the loss o f m eaning ex­
perienced by “grand theories” and their respective meta-narratives. In their 
stead approaches are beginning to appear which stress discontinuity and 
difference, although that by no means implies that social o r cultural histori­
cal science has renounced its claim to be an autonom ous discipline, on the 
basis that it focuses on historical change. The theoretical construction and 
descriptions of “historical developm ents” as “secular trends”, som ething 
which has enjoyed great popularity amongst academic researchers and their 
public in recent years (to name but one example, N orbert Elias’ by now 
famous theory of civilisation73) , can in many ways be considered somewhat
72 Although as yet scarcely noticed by social history, see the “classic” studies by C. S. 
Pierce, Collected Papers, Cambridge 1931. F o ran  introduction to P ierce’s work, see: L. 
Nagl, C. S. Peirce, Frankfurt 1992; see too the discussions of “qualitative social research” 
in (am ong others), B.C. Glaser and A.L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research, Chicago 1967; J. Reichertz, Probleme qualitativer 
Sozialforschung, Frankfurt 1985; P. Zedier and  H. M oser (eds.), Aspekte qualitativer 
Sozialforschung, O pladen 1983. See also the references given in Footnote 2.
73 N. Elias, Über dm Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen, 
2 vol., Frankfurt 1976, esp. vol. 2: W andlungen der Gesellschaft. Entw urf zu einer
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suspicious in ideological terms, because of its insistence on a clearly directed 
developmental path. Theoretical analyses stressing continuity and coherence 
favour the suppression of contradictions and the sm oothing over of breaks 
and fissures; developm ental theories presumably owe their persuasive force 
to their ability to raise hopes about gaining an overview o f the broken land­
scapes o f the historical world. As long as they are plausible in their formu­
lation, teleological models frequently allow their authors to pass over gaps 
in empirical knowledge or tem pt them to offer a “tendentious” interpreta­
tion of texts, images and objects in line with the “developmental path” be­
ing followed. Thanks to its greater empirical strengths, however, cultural 
scientific social history will be able to point up more breakages, interrup­
tions and turning-points in the past, than these “lines of developm ent” can 
cover over. And as the historical philosopher Frank R. Ankersmit has re­
cently put it, social history will not so much contribute to a consolidation of 
identity than to m aking questionable identities more uncertain.74
A thoroughly cultural scientific social history will not be working alone 
in applying the approaches sketched here. The trends m entioned above are 
im m anent, if no t present already, in all the cultural and social sciences and 
humanities disciplines, albeit with different degrees of intensity. Indeed, these 
changes are visible beyond academic disciplines, being apparent in archi­
tecture, literature, philosophy, and not least, in our experiences in daily life: 
w hether we agree with the term  or not, they are characteristics comm on to 
the post-m odern period,75 a time when modernity is increasing its efforts to 
think critically about its forms of knowledge, not least its idea of history.
Translation from the German by Laurence Cole/London
T heorie d er Zivilisation. For a critique of the teleological nature of this “theory of 
civilisation”, see H. Kuzmics and I. Mörth (eds.), Der unendliche Prozeß der Zivilisation. 
Zur Kultursoziologie der Moderne nachN. Elias, Frankfurt 1991.
74 See the discussion with Frank Ankersmit in: ÖZG 4 (1993), pp. 457-466.
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